"REGARDED AS DISABLED" CLAIMS UNDER THE
ADA: SAFETY NET OR CATCH-ALL?
Risa M. Misht
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination
against "a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."' The
ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires."2 In order to establish a claim under the ADA,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that she: (1) is a disabled person within the
meaning of the ADA; (2) is qualified to perform the essential functions of
her job either with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) was
discriminated against because of her alleged disability
To meet the first prong of this prima facie case-that is, to
demonstrate that one is a disabled person within the meaning of the
ADA-a plaintiff must show either that she: (1) has a physical impairment
that substantially limits one or more her major life activities; or (2) has a
record of such an impairment; or (3) is "regarded as having such an
impairment." 4 This last test, known as the "regarded as disabled" test, is a
particularly interesting facet of the ADA. The test focuses less on the
extent of an individual's actual impairment and more on how others
perceive the individual, as well as the effect of those perceptions on the
attitudes toward, and assumptions about, the individual's abilities.
The ADA regulations provide that an individual is "regarded as
t Risa M. Mish is a partner in the law firm of Collazo Carling & Mish LLP in New
York. The firm's practice is devoted to the representation of employers in all areas of labor
and employment law. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Stanley L.
Meyer, an associate at the firm, in preparing this article.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
3. See, e.g., Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997)
(delineating what a plaintiff must establish to go forward with a claim under the ADA).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C).
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disabled" if she: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that does not
substantially limit major life activities but is treated by an employer as
constituting such limitation; (2) has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of
others toward such impairment; or (3) has none of the impairments
specified in the ADA subsection,5 but is treated by an employer as having a
substantially limiting impairment. Therefore, an individual will be
"regarded as disabled" when others behave toward that individual as if she
had a substantially limiting impairment, regardless of whether the
individual actually has such an impairment.
The "regarded as disabled" provision, which is derived from similar
language in the ADA's precursor statute, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 7
was intended by Congress to provide relief to individuals who are
discriminated against because of the "myths, fears, and stereotypes
associated with disabilities."8 In short, the "regarded as disabled"
provision was designed as a safety net for the individual who, though not
in fact disabled from performing a particular job, was nevertheless
discriminated against based upon the erroneous assumptions of others
about such individual's ability to perform that job.
The legislative history of this provision, though scant, provides two
examples of individuals who would be considered "regarded as disabled,"
and therefore entitled to ADA protection: (1) a severe burn victim who is
denied employment based on the employer's personal discomfort with
disfigurement; and (2) an individual whose pre-employment physical
reveals a back anomaly, and who is denied employment despite the
absence of any symptoms of actual back impairment because of the
employer's fear of injury and increased insurance or workers'
compensation costs. 9

Significantly, neither example offered by Congress includes an
employee who is not only perceived as disabled, but is also in fact unable
to perform the essential functions of the job in question. To the contrary,
the legislative history specifically notes that the phrase "essential
functions" is included within the definition of "qualified individual with a
disability" in order to "ensure that employers can continue to require that
5. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(3).
6. See, e.g., Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that
the focus is on the impairment's effect upon the attitudes of others).

7. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).
8. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(II), at 30-31 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 452,
452-53; see also School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987)
("regarded as disabled" provision intended to combat the effects of "archaic attitudes,"
erroneous perceptions, and myths that disadvantage persons with, or regarded as having,
disabilities).
9. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1m), at 30, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 452.
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all applicants and employees, including those with disabilities, are able to
perform the essential... functions of the job in question."'
Both the
legislative history and the actual language of the ADA make clear that the
"regarded as disabled" provision is intended to benefit only those
employees erroneously perceived to be disabled, and who are in fact fully
able to perform the essential functions of that job.
In practice, however, this safety-net provision of the ADA is
sometimes used as a sort of "catch-all" for purported disability
discrimination claims that would otherwise be dismissed for failure to
meet the definition of a "qualified individual with a disability."
Specifically, plaintiffs who are unable to demonstrate that they have an
impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, and that they are
able to perform the essential functions of the position from which they are
excluded, nevertheless argue that they are entitled to ADA protection
because an employer "regarded" them as disabled. Even more troubling,
these would-be ADA plaintiffs are relying (sometimes successfully) on
legitimate, business-related actions by employers-such as having
prospective employees undergo post-offer, pre-employment physicals to
confirm the employees' ability to perform essential job functions, or
referring problem employees to Employee Assistance Programs-to
support "regarded as disabled" claims.
This article examines in detail two recent cases in which courts
permitted ADA plaintiffs to proceed to trial. In both cases, the "evidence"
proffered by the plaintiffs to support a "regarded as disabled" claim relied
on a challenge to legitimate, business-related employer actions. In both
cases, the court seemingly disregarded the plaintiffs' obligation to
demonstrate that they were "otherwise qualified" to perform the jobs from
which they allegedly were discriminatorily excluded. These cases
illustrate the chief perils of reading the "regarded as disabled" prong too
broadly: impeding an employer's ability to conduct legitimate workplace
inquiries and interfering with employer actions designed to ensure that
employees comply with work rules and are able to perform the jobs for
which they are hired.
I.

EEOC V. JOSLYN MANUFACTURING CO.

In EEOC v. Joslyn Manufacturing Co.," the EEOC alleged that
defendant Joslyn Manufacturing Company ("Joslyn") violated the ADA
when it failed to hire an individual named Aaron Cruz for a position as a
punch press operator because, inter alia,2 the company regarded Mr. Cruz
10. See id. at 55, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 337.
11. No. 95-C4956, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9882 (N.D. Ill.
July 11, 1996).

12. The EEOC contended alternatively that Joslyn violated the ADA by failing to hire
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as disabled. 3 Before applying to work at Joslyn, Mr. Cruz had worked in
various capacities at Oscar Mayer Company. During his employment at
Oscar Mayer, Mr. Cruz began suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome. Mr.
Cruz's condition ultimately required surgery, which led him to file for
workers' compensation benefits.'
In connection with his application for benefits, Mr. Cruz was
examined by two different physicians, who noted his complaints of
soreness and stiffness in his hands, as well as numbness or tingling in his
fingers. One of the physicians concluded that Mr. Cruz's carpal tunnel
injury had resulted in "substantial industrial loss to his right hand and a
moderate industrial loss to his left hand."' 5 Cruz received a "lump sum
payment of approximately $15,000 for a percentage loss of his wrists or
hands."' 6
One month after this medical examination, Cruz applied for the
position of punch press operator at Joslyn. The position required Cruz to
take a part from a box at waist level, insert it into a die located six to eight
inches higher, cycle the press, remove the part, and throw the part into
another box. This procedure constituted the essential function of the
punch press operator position. 7
In connection with his application for employment at Joslyn, Cruz
was given a tour of the facilities, including the punch press room. Cruz
told the Joslyn managers that he could operate the punch press. In
addition, Cruz received a copy of Joslyn's job description for the punch
press operator position and signed a certification stating that he was
capable of performing the job as described. Joslyn representatives told
Cruz that, in the event he was offered the position, he would be required to
undergo a post-offer, pre-employment medical examination.
Cruz
agreed. 8
After reviewing Cruz's application and the results of his interviews
with various Joslyn personnel, Joslyn offered Cruz the punch press
operator position. Cruz then arranged for the required post-offer medical
examination. At the medical examination, Cruz completed a medical
history form on which he indicated that he had undergone surgery for
carpal tunnel syndrome. The physician reviewing the medical history form
and conducting the examination had, coincidentally, worked as a punch
Mr. Cruz because of his "record of disability." Id. at *1. Although the court denied
Joslyn's summary judgment motion on this basis, the "record of disability" analysis is
beyond the scope of this article and will not, therefore, be discussed herein.
13. See id.
14. See id. at *4.
15. Id. at* 5.
16. Id.
17. See id. at *5-6.
18. Id. at *7.
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press operator during college, and so was personally familiar with the
physical demands of the position. The physician conducted range-ofmotion and muscle-strength tests on Cruz which caused Cruz to feel
tingling and numbness in his fingertips. 9
Based on the examination, the physician documented on Cruz's workstatus discharge sheet a recommendation that Cruz not work in a position
involving "repetitive motions of bilateral hands."2" Due to the physician's
recommendation and the fact that the punch press operator position
required repetitive bilateral hand movements, Joslyn withdrew its offer of
employment to Cruz.
In analyzing Joslyn's motion for summary judgment on the ADA
"regarded as disabled" claim, the court correctly acknowledged that Cruz's
failure to qualify for the position of punch press operator could not, by
itself, establish that he was a disabled person within the meaning of the
ADA because "[a]n employer does not necessarily regard an employee as
disabled simply by finding the employee incapable of satisfying the
singular demands of a particular job.",2' The court then stated, however,
that "the proper test [to determine whether an employer regards an
employee as disabled] is whether the impairment, as perceived, would
affect the individual's ability to find work across a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes."'
The court went on to conclude that the EEOC had presented sufficient
evidence that Cruz's impairment, as "perceived" by Joslyn, affected Cruz's
ability to find work across a class of jobs. The court based this conclusion
on three factors: (1) Cruz's "educational and employment background
demonstrate a capacity for low and semi-skilled work, but not jobs that
require a college education or any type of professional training"; (2)
Cruz's "perceived impairment" disqualified him from seven other
positions at Joslyn; and (3) Cruz's "perceived impairment" disqualified
him from the job that he formerly held at Oscar Mayer.23
In reaching this conclusion, the court erred in several key respects.
First, the court incorrectly relied on evidence (or, more accurately,
suppositions) about how other employers might treat Cruz's impairment.
Specifically, the court hypothesized about how a past employer, Oscar
Mayer, would have treated Cruz's impairment. The court also assumed
that, given Cruz's lack of education and broad employment experience, his

19. See id. at *7-8.
20. Id. at *9.
21. Id. at *17 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)); see also Wooten, 58 F.3d 382 at 386;
Welsh v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 977 F.2d 1415, 1417 (10th Cir. 1992); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794
F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986)).
22. Joslyn, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9882, at *18.
23. See id. at *19.
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impairment would affect future employers. The perceptions of employers
other than the defendant, however, should have been irrelevant to the
"regarded as disabled" analysis.
Indeed, one of the very cases on which the Joslyn court purported to
rely, Cook v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health,24 makes clear that the
perception of other, or future, employers should be irrelevant to the
"regarded as disabled" analysis. In Cook, which was brought under the
Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff-applicant was excluded from a position at
a mental health facility based on the employer's perception that the
applicant's morbid obesity made her unfit to work as an institutional
attendant for the mentally retarded. The employer argued that the
applicant could not proceed with a "regarded as disabled" claim because
she had not demonstrated that her condition precluded her from
employment other than the position she sought. The court rejected this
argument, explaining that the statute
simply does not condition such claims on either the quantum of a
plaintiff's application efforts or on her prospects offinding other
employment. By way of illustration, suit can be brought against a
warehouse operator who refuses to hire all turquoise-eyed
applicants solely because he believes that people with such
coloring are universally incapable of lifting large crates,
notwithstanding that other warehousemen might hire the
applicants.25
Similarly, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,26 the court affirmed
dismissal of "regarded as disabled" claims brought under the ADA by two
applicants for pilot positions at United Air Lines. The applicants were
denied employment based on the airline's requirement that pilots have
In assessing the airline's reason for
20/100 uncorrected vision.
disqualifying the applicants, the court explained:
We are concerned with whether United regards Plaintiffs as
"disabled," not whether the airline industry as a whole regards
individuals with uncorrected vision of 20/100 or worse as
"substantially limited" in a major life activity. It is the
perception of the employer in the case, not the perceptions or
practicesof others in the industry, that matters.2 7
In addition to incorrectly basing its "regarded as disabled" conclusion
on the supposed perceptions or practices of other employers, the Joslyn
court erred in its analysis of whether Cruz's impairment "substantially

24.
25.
26.
27.

10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added).
No. 96-1481, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33608, at *40 (10th Cir. Nov. 26, 1997).
Id. at *31 (emphasis added).
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limited" him in the major life activity of working. Cruz could not
demonstrate that he was "regarded as disabled" unless he could show that
his impairment, or perceived impairment, "substantially limited" him in
the performance of a major life activity.' The EEOC argued that Cruz's
perceived disability "substantially limited" his ability to work because it
significantly restricted his ability to perform either "a class of jobs or a
broad range of jobs in various classes" as compared to the average person
with comparable training, skills and abilities.29 The Joslyn court agreed. 0
However, the ADA regulations define a "class of jobs" as "[t]he job
from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment,
and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge,
skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual
is also disqualified because of the impairment., 3' In Joslyn, the defendant
introduced evidence, unrebutted by the EEOC or Cruz, that at least
fourteen other diverse types of jobs existed at Joslyn that utilized similar
training, skill or abilities, did not require repetitive hand movements, and
from which Cruz's impairment would not have disqualified him. 2 The
court disregarded this evidence, finding instead that the EEOC had
satisfied a "minimal" burden of raising a genuine issue of fact as to
whether Cruz's impairment substantially limited him by asserting that
seven other jobs required the type of hand movement from which Cruz was
restricted. These seven jobs were all variations on the machine operator
position for which Cruz applied 3
This narrow analysis, however, does not suffice as a matter of law to
satisfy the "substantially limited" requirement. Other courts examining
this issue have consistently refused to find that plaintiffs were
"substantially limited" in the major life activity of working where evidence
was presented that, notwithstanding plaintiffs' physical impairments, they
were qualified to perform the essential functions of other jobs. For
example, in McKay v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc.,M the
plaintiff, an employee in the company's body-weld division, was fired
after her symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome were shown to prevent her
from performing the repetitive motions required of her position and to
cause her to be absent from work. The EEOC, as in Joslyn, argued that the
plaintiff was "substantially limited" in the major life activity of working
because her carpal tunnel syndrome disqualified her "from performing any

28. Joslyn, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9882, at *14.
29. Id. at *16.

30. See id. at *20-21.
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
32. See Joslyn, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9882, at *21.
33. See id. at *22.
34. 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir.), reh'gen banc denied, 110 F.3d 369 (May 12, 1997).
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manual labor exceeding light duty. 35 The court, however, rejected this
argument, holding instead that
the physical restrictions caused by plaintiff's disability do not
significantly restrict her ability to perform the class of jobs at
issue, manufacturing jobs; at best, her evidence supports a
conclusion that her impairment disqualifies her from only the
narrow range of assembly line manufacturing jobs that require
repetitive motion or frequent lifting of more than ten pounds. It
follows that her limited impairment would not significantly
restrict her ability to perform a broad range of jobs in various
classes.36
The Joslyn court likewise should have found that Cruz was not
"substantially limited" in the major life activity of working because, even
if he was unable to perform punch press operator and other machineoperator positions, Cruz was still able to perform many other jobs, at
Joslyn and elsewhere, that did not require repetitive hand motion. Instead,
the Joslyn court incorrectly allowed the ADA claim to proceed, based on
the narrow "evidence" that Cruz was restricted from performing the job for
which he applied and a handful of other nearly identical jobs at Joslyn.
The most serious error made by the Joslyn court, however, was that it
performed its "regarded as disabled" analysis without first determining
whether Cruz's undisputed physical impairment actually disqualified him
from performing the essential functions of the job for which he applied.
Indeed, regardless of whether Cruz's carpal tunnel syndrome might have
precluded him from performing 10, 100, or 1,000 other jobs, if his medical
condition precluded him from being able to perform the essential functions
35. Id. at 373.
36. Id.; see also Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1997)
(plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome was not "substantially limited" in the major life
activity of working because she was able to perform a different job at the same plant that
did not entail repetitive hand motions); Ouzts v. USAir, Inc., No. 94-625, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11610 (W.D. Pa. July 26, 1996), aff'd, 118 F.3d 1577 (3d Cir. 1997) (dismissing
ADA claims by plaintiffs whose carpal tunnel syndrome prevented them from performing
their original jobs and holding that plaintiffs were not "substantially limited" in their ability
to work because they were able to perform other jobs at the airline and at least one of the
plaintiffs had actually worked in another industry); Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d
718, 723 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1147 (1995) ("impairment that disqualifies a
person from only a narrow range of jobs is not considered a substanially limiting one");
Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 944 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1152
(1995) (evidence showing inability to perform certain physical jobs failed to establish
inability to work generally); Soileu v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 928 F.Supp. 37, 49 (D. Me.
1996), aff'd, 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997) (plaintiff who is capable of performing other jobs
"is not substantially limited in his ability to work and thus not disabled under the ADA");
Kohnke v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 93C7096, 1995 WL 505973, at *4 (N.D. l. 1995) (in
order to be "substantially limited" in the major life activity of working, "an ADA plaintiff
must be precluded from working generally").
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of the actual job for which he applied at Joslyn, he was not a "qualified
individual with a disability" within the meaning of the ADA and,
therefore, not entitled to proceed with an ADA claim against Joslyn.
When the court instead focused its attention on the extent to which the
plaintiffs condition might limit his alternate job prospects, the court
glossed over the linchpin of ADA analysis; that is, whether the plaintiff
was a "qualified individual with a disability."
The Joslyn court cited Cook v. State of Rhode Island in support of its
decision,37 which actually underscores the error of its analysis. In Cook, an
employer barred an applicant from a position as institutional attendant for
the mentally retarded (IA-MR) based solely on the fact that the applicant
was "morbidly obese."3 However, in contrast to the facts of Joslyn, the
employer's own pre-employment physical examination of the applicant
resulted in a satisfactory report which "found no limitations that impinged
upon her ability to do the job."39 Moreover, the IA-MR position for which
the applicant applied "did not demand any elevated level of mobility,
lifting ability, size or stature."' Notwithstanding this evaluation, and the
fact that the applicant had worked for the employer previously as an IAMR without any difficulty, the employer refused to hire the applicant
based on the employer's speculation that the applicant's weight would
"promote absenteeism and increase the likelihood of workers'
compensation claims."'"
Cook is a textbook case of "regarded as disabled" discrimination. In
Cook, the employer rejected an otherwise qualified applicant based solely
on the employer's unwarranted assumption that an overweight employee
would be absent and injured more frequently than an employee of average
weight. By contrast, Joslyn's rejection of Cruz was based neither on
"assumptions" about Cruz's ability to do the punch press operator job nor
on the potential effects of his carpal tunnel syndrome on attendance or
insurance claims. Rather, Joslyn rejected Cruz because of a medical
recommendation that Cruz not work in a job that entailed repetitive
bilateral hand movements-such as the one for which he applied. Under
these circumstances, Cruz never should have reached "first base" in an
ADA lawsuit because he could not satisfy the basic prerequisite of ADA
protection: a showing that he was able to perform the essential functions of
the job from which he was excluded.
For example, in Dimond v. J.C. Penney Co.,4 2 the court dismissed an
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9882, at *21.
See Cook v. State of Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1993).
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 21.
No. 94-718, 1996 W'L 912159 (D.N.M. May 16, 1996).
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ADA complaint filed by an employee who was terminated from
employment as a customer service representative after being diagnosed
with carpal tunnel syndrome. A medical examination of the plaintiff
resulted in a recommendation that he not use "his hands on a keyboard or
do[] any other type of repetitive motion work."' However, keying data
into a computer was one of the essential functions of the plaintiff's job.
Therefore, the court dismissed the plaintiff's ADA claim, explaining that
the plaintiff was not a "'qualified' individual with a disability" because he
was unable to perform the essential functions of the position from which
he was terminated." Similarly, the Joslyn court should have concluded
that Cruz was not "otherwise qualified" within the meaning of the ADA
because he was physically unable to perform the essential functions of the
position from which he was excluded, and therefore, a primafacie case of
disability discrimination could not be established.
In addition, the Joslyn court should have rejected the "regarded as
disabled" claim because the employer did not rely on "myths" regarding
the abilities of persons with Cruz's medical condition. Rather, the
employer based its decision on a physician's assessment that Cruz should
not perform the type of job for which he had originally been hired. Other
courts have applied this reasoning. For example, in Wooten v. Farmland
Foods,4 the court affirmed the dismissal of an ADA "regarded as
disabled" claim because the employer, in making the challenged
termination decision, relied upon information supplied by the employee's
physician regarding the employee's alleged medical restrictions."
In Wooten, the plaintiff was employed as a ham boner in a meatpacking facility. Six months after returning from a two-week absence, the
plaintiff submitted a physician's note which stated that the plaintiff had
carpal tunnel syndrome and was restricted to "light duty-no work with
meat products-no work in cold environment-lifting 10 lbs. frequently
20 lbs. maximum." 47 No positions were available at the plant to
accommodate these restrictions; accordingly, the employer terminated the
plaintiff's employment.
The plaintiff brought suit under the ADA, arguing that he was either
disabled or regarded as such by the employer. However, in affirming the
dismissal of the plaintiffs "regarded as disabled" claim, the court

43. Id. at *6-7.
44. Id. at *10; see also Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, 873 F. Supp. 547, 556 (D. Kan.
1995) (dismissing "regarded as disabled" claim after concluding that plaintiff could not
perform the essential functions of her job and "holding as a matter of law that plaintiff is
not a 'qualified individual with a disability"' protected by the ADA).
45. See Wooten, 58 F.3d at 382.
46. See id. at 386.
47. Id. at 384.
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explained that "[t]he evidence bearing on Farmland Foods' perception of
Wooten's impairment indicates that its perception was not based upon
speculation, stereotype, or myth, but upon a doctor's written restriction of
Wooten's physical abilities. 48
The Wooten court's reading of the ADA's "regarded as disabled"
provision appropriately focused on the source of the employer's perception
regarding the extent and significance of the plaintiff s physical limitations.
Where the employer's "perception" is the result of information obtained
from a medical practitioner who has examined the plaintiff and is stating
the extent of the plaintiff's actual impairment and restrictions, the
employer does not unlawfully discriminate against the plaintiff based on
mythical or stereotypical assumptions; rather, the employer acts on the
basis of a legitimate, job-related assessment of the employee's ability to
perform essential job functions. Under these circumstances, "regarded as
disabled" liability ought not to follow unless the plaintiff comes forward
with evidence of discriminatory animus, such as disparaging comments or
disparate treatment. Indeed, such a reading is fully supported by the
legislative history of this provision.49
By contrast, adoption of the Joslyn reasoning essentially would
nullify the post-offer, pre-employment physical, which is a legitimate
exercise by employers to determine whether applicants are in fact able to
perform the jobs for which they are hired. Under Joslyn, an employer is
discouraged from relying in good faith on the results of a post-offer
physical examination to deny employment if the discovered impairment
would also preclude the applicant from working at other jobs. Such a
result was clearly not intended by Congress when it enacted the ADA. The
statute expressly permits employers to conduct post-offer, pre-employment
medical examinations where such examinations are conducted on all
entering employees in the applicant's job category and the information is
used to determine an employee's fitness to perform essential job
functions. 0
Instead of the approach adopted by the Joslyn court, courts should
decline to find "regarded as disabled" liability where the challenged
employment decision is based upon medical restrictions revealed in postoffer, pre-employment physicals, and where such restrictions go to the

48. Id. at 386.
49. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(M), at 30-31 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 453 ("[I]f a person is disqualified on the basis of an actual or perceived physical or
mental condition, and the employer can articulateno legitimate,job-related reasonfor the
rejection, a perceived concern about employing persons with disabilities could be inferred
and the plaintiff would qualify for coverage under the 'regarded as' test.") (emphasis
added).
50. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b).
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essential functions of the position sought by the applicant. In such cases,
the courts should hold that the plaintiff is not a "qualified individual with a
disability" and thus cannot establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination under the ADA.
II.

HOLIHAN V. LUCKY STORES, INC.

Another example of how the "regarded as disabled" provision can be
read too broadly, and thus be misused, is presented by Holihan v. Lucky
Stores, Inc. In Holihan, the plaintiff was an employee who had worked
as a store manager for the Lucky's chain of supermarkets for sixteen years
without incident. Beginning in 1992, however, Lucky's began to receive
numerous complaints from employees who charged the plaintiff with
"hostility and abusiveness, including manhandling, berating and
threatening employees." As a result of these complaints, a meeting was
convened with the plaintiff and his district manager and supervisor. At
this meeting, the supervisor asked the plaintiff to explain these incidents,
and inquired if the plaintiff was having any "problems" with which the
company could assist. The plaintiff denied the complaints, and denied that
he had any problems. The district manager and supervisor determined that
the plaintiff would be transferred to another store that had no history of
personnel problems.
Over the course of the following three months, the plaintiff's district
manager received fifty-one separate complaints from thirteen different
employees, all of whom complained about the plaintiff s abusive behavior.
The employees related that the plaintiff had thrown food from shelves and
directed employees to clean it up, had repeatedly threatened to fire the
entire staff, and had violated money handling and other office procedures.
However, when the district manager and the Division Vice President of
Operations met with the plaintiff to discuss these allegations, the plaintiff
either denied the allegations or claimed that they were exaggerated. The
plaintiff was then told to choose between either a suspension pending a
company investigation into the allegations or a leave of absence to obtain
counseling. The plaintiff chose the latter option.
Lucky's Employee Assistance Program ("EAP") referred the plaintiff
to a psychologist who diagnosed the plaintiff as "experiencing stress
related problems precipitated by work," and recommended that the
plaintiff not return to work for three months. The psychologist forwarded
this recommendation and diagnosis to Lucky's.
The plaintiff then filed a workers' compensation claim based on his
alleged work-induced stress. In connection with this claim, the plaintiff

51. 87 F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1349 (1997).
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was sent by the company's insurance carrier to a physician who diagnosed
the plaintiff as suffering from "Organic Mental Syndrome, Not Otherwise
Specified." This diagnosis was sent to the insurance carrier, but not to
Lucky's.
The plaintiff requested that Lucky's grant him an extension of his
leave of absence. In support of this request, the plaintiff submitted to
Lucky's a "Claimant's Certification," prepared by the physician who
treated him in connection with his workers' compensation claim. The
certification stated that the plaintiff was suffering from "depression and
anxiety" and recommended that he not return to work for another month.
Lucky's granted the plaintiff's request.
In April and May of 1993, the plaintiff again requested extensions of
his leave of absence, and again supported his request with notes from his
physician, who diagnosed the plaintiff as having anxiety and depression.
Lucky's granted the first request, but denied the second and fired the
plaintiff, explaining that the plaintiff had already exceeded the six months
of leave available under the company's leave of absence policy.
Four months later, the plaintiff reapplied for a job with the company.
Although Lucky's had no available store-manager positions at the time the
plaintiff applied, the company did agree to rehire the plaintiff as a clerk.
In addition, the plaintiff was informed that he could apply for a storemanager position as soon as one became available. The plaintiff refused
the job offer and sued the company under the ADA, alleging that Lucky's
had discriminated against him either because he was disabled, or because
the company regarded him as disabled.
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that while the
plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence to create a material fact
dispute as to whether he was actually disabled, he had presented sufficient
evidence to raise a question as to his "regarded as disabled" claim.52 The
court based this latter conclusion on three factors: (1) the plaintiff's district
manager had asked if the plaintiff was "having problems"; (2) the
company had strongly encouraged the plaintiff to seek the assistance of the
company EAP; and (3) the company had received several doctors' reports
in connection with the plaintiff's application for workers' compensation
benefits and a leave of absence extension, which diagnosed him as
suffering from depression, anxiety, and stress.53
The court's holding in the Holihan case should deeply trouble
employers. The case suggests that an employer is subjecting itself to
52. See id. at 366. The court noted that the plaintiff, while on his leaves of absence,
had pursued real estate and sign-making businesses. The court therefore concluded that the
plaintiff's mental condition did not "substantially limit" his ability to work. See id.
53. See id.
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liability under the ADA merely by meeting with an employee who engages
in misconduct and inquiring generally into the reasons for that misconduct;
or by referring a poor-performance employee to a counselor; or by
receiving documentation from an employee's physician. Because of the
employer's efforts to accommodate an employee, liability will stem from
any subsequent adverse employment action under the "regarded as
disabled" provision of the statute. However, nothing about the employer's
conduct in the Holihan case suggests that the employer discriminated
against the plaintiff based on an erroneous perception that he was
substantially limited in his ability to work. To the contrary, the employer,
in fact, offered the plaintiff another position at the company, which alone
should have sufficed to bar the "regarded as disabled" claim.-4 Moreover,
the employer uniformly applied to the plaintiff a neutral policy limiting
leaves of absence to six months (regardless of the reason for the leave),
and then offered to consider the plaintiff for a store-manager position
when one became available. In other words, the employer did nothing
more than insist that all of its employees, including the plaintiff, perform
the essential job function of regularly attending work.
In the Holihan case, the plaintiff produced no evidence of disparate
treatment to support his discrimination claim. For instance, the plaintiff
was unable to show that employees who had not been referred to the
company's EAP were permitted to exceed the six-month leave of absence
cap, or that the company created managerial positions for such employees
when they chose to reapply for employment. Therefore, the plaintiff failed
to prove he was treated differently when he was terminated and then not
offered a non-existent managerial position.
In addition, the plaintiff did not present evidence that the employer
falsely informed him that no managerial positions were available.
Unbelievably, the plaintiff was permitted to proceed on a "regarded as
disabled" claim based on nothing more than the fact that the employer had
referred him to the company's EAP (following a series of employee
complaints about his managerial misconduct) and had received from his
physicians notes that indicated he was suffering from anxiety and stress.
These notes were proffered by the employee to support continuing requests
for extensions of his leave of absence, most of which were granted.
Without any evidence linking Lucky's legitimate decision to refer the
plaintiff to its EAP to an actual perception that the plaintiff was
substantially limited in a major life activity, or to circumstances giving rise
54. See Howard v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 904 F. Supp. 922, 930 (E.D. Wis.
1995), affd, 107 F.3d 13 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that evidence that employer continued to
assign work to ADA plaintiff establishes that employer did not consider plaintiff to be
substantially limited in his activities); Soileu v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 928 F. Supp. 37, 51
(D. Me. 1996).
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to an inference of discrimination, the court should not have permitted the
plaintiff to proceed to trial on a "regarded as disabled" claim. This is
particularly so given the prevalence and effectiveness of EAPs in the
workplace. A recent survey of Fortune 1000 companies found that a full
eighty-eight percent of these companies operate EAPs, with services
encompassing assessment and referrals, short-term counseling, crisis
intervention, free legal services, and even referrals to child- or elder-care
services." The business and psychological communities have widely
acknowledged that EAPs are instrumental in improving work performance
and conduct issues that might otherwise lead to employment termination.
The Holihan holding is counterintuitive because no employer would
needlessly incur the expense of EAPs if the employer truly believed that
the employees it was referring to the EAPs were "substantially limited" in
their ability to work. To the contrary, companies offer and refer
employees to EAPs not because they believe that their employees are
disabled, but because they believe that the employees are fully capable of
making a positive contribution to the company. These employees could
make a positive contribution once they obtain assistance with the issues
temporarily interfering with their ability to work.
However, beneficial as EAPs are, an employer will now have to think
twice before referring an employee to one, since, under the reasoning of
Holihan, doing so might subject the employer to ADA liability under the
"regarded as disabled" provision. Ironically, if the employer in Holihan
had simply fired the plaintiff without making any attempts to help him, the
plaintiff would have had no evidence upon which to base his "regarded as
disabled" claim. Instead, because the employer attempted to minimize the
consequences of the plaintiffs misconduct by permitting him to have time
off from work and receive assistance with his management and
communication skills, the employer unwittingly subjected itself to an ADA
lawsuit. It is hard to imagine that Congress envisioned this result when it
enacted the ADA and included the "regarded as disabled" provision in the
statute.
It is equally hard to imagine that Congress intended employees to be
able to state a claim under the ADA merely because, as in Holihan, they
had once provided their employers with medical documentation in
connection with an application for workers' compensation benefits or a
leave of absence. Submitting physicians' notes to an employer is not only
a routine workplace procedure, but also a statutory requirement for
procuring certain benefits, such as leave under the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993.56 If the mere fact that an employer had a note from an
55. See Daniel S. Levine, Companies Seek to Keep PersonalProblemsfrom Becoming
PersonnelProblems,S.F. Bus. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1996.
56. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (1995) (providing that in order to qualify for an FMLA
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employee's physician were sufficient to create "regarded as disabled"
liability under the ADA, nearly every employee in the country would be
able to state such a claim.
An employer's knowledge of an employee's temporary medical
condition or impairment should not be sufficient to create a fact dispute
about whether the employer regarded that employee as disabled. As the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently noted in Kelly v. Drexel
University, it would be unreasonable to permit any member of any
protected class to survive summary judgment on a discrimination
complaint merely by demonstrating that "an employer was aware that he or
and that the individual then suffered an
she was a member of such a5class
7
adverse employment action."
In Kelly, an employee who was terminated after his job was
eliminated alleged that he was discriminated against on the basis of the
degenerative joint disease that he suffered in his right hip. The plaintiff
argued that either he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, or that
the university regarded him as such. In support of the latter claim, the
plaintiff argued that he had a "visible and apparent" limp, and that
therefore his employer was clearly aware that he had a physical
impairment. 8 In rejecting the plaintiff's "regarded as disabled" claim, the
court explained:
the mere fact that an employer is aware of an employee's
impairment is insufficient to demonstrate either that the
employer regarded the employee as disabled or that that
perception caused the adverse employment action .... If we
held otherwise, then by a parity of reasoning, a person in a group
protected from adverse employment actions, i.e., anyone, could
establish a prima facie discrimination case merely by
demonstrating some adverse action against the individual and
that the employer was aware that the employee's characteristic
59
placed him or her in the group, e.g., race, age or sex.
While no one would suggest that "regarded as disabled" plaintiffs
ought to be barred from proceeding to trial unless they can produce
"smoking gun" evidence such as disparaging, disability-related comments
made by the relevant decision maker, plaintiffs should not be permitted to
leave, an employee must provide a requested Certification of Physician or Medical
Practitioner when requesting a leave of absence).
57. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1996).
58. Id. at 109.
59. Id.; see also Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th
Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of "regarded as disabled" claim and rejecting argument that
employer's "mere knowledge" of employee's medical condition and work restrictions as
documented by his physician showed that employer regarded employee as having a
disabling impairment).

1998]

"REGARDED AS DISABLED" ADA CLAIMS

survive summary judgment merely by asserting that an employer knew of
their medical condition and then later subjected them to an adverse
employment action. In enacting the ADA, Congress took care to note that
not every physical or mental impairment entitled an individual to statutory
protection.' Therefore, in assessing "regarded as disabled" ADA claims,
courts should be just as vigorous in their analysis of the plaintiff's prima
facie case as they are in cases where a plaintiff claims to be actually
disabled.
In short, courts should require "regarded as disabled" plaintiffs to
demonstrate that: (1) their impairment, as perceived, would substantially
limit them in the performance of a major life activity, and not just bar them
from a particular job or handful of nearly identical jobs; (2)
notwithstanding their impairment or perceived impairment, they can in fact
perform the essential functions of the position in question; and (3) the
challenged adverse employment action occurred in circumstances giving
rise to an inference of discrimination. Regarding this last prong, some
evidence must be adduced to demonstrate that the employer in question
treated the "regarded as disabled" plaintiff differently than it has treated or
would treat other similarly situated individuals who are not regarded as
disabled.
If a would-be "regarded as disabled" plaintiff cannot satisfy all three
of these tests, a court should dismiss the ADA complaint. One court has
stated that to hold otherwise, merely because a plaintiff's particular
impairment bars him from satisfying a particular job requirement, or
because the plaintiff has shown that the employer had knowledge of a
certain medical condition, is "to stand [the ADA] on its head.""' In
addition, by upholding the plaintiff s complaint, a court would be equating
truly disabled individuals, who need the protections of the ADA, with
those who are merely dissatisfied with an employment outcome and cannot
fit themselves into any other statutorily protected category. For the sake of
employers who wish to continue to provide employees with valuable
benefits such as EAPs and medical leaves of absence, but who may not be
willing to do so at the risk of opening the floodgates to meritless and costly
ADA litigation, one can only hope that the courts will turn away from an
overbroad reading of the "regarded as disabled" provision. Instead, courts
should require "regarded as disabled" plaintiffs to satisfy the same
requirements of proof as their counterparts who are actually disabled.

60. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111) at 52 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,
334.
61. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 96-1481, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33608, at
*39 (10th Cir. Nov. 26, 1997).

